Introduction
In the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) it is possible to identify workers who have changed employers voluntarily.
1 That is, workers who report they were neither fired nor subject to a layoff or shutdown. While the majority of the voluntary leavers move to new jobs that pay more than their previous job, a surprisingly substantial proportion (approximately 42%) move to new jobs where the wages are actually lower.
2
Why might people quit their higher paying jobs and move into lower paying ones? While there are many potential explanations, this paper models wages as only one component of a job.
3
That is, jobs consist of a tied wage and amenity package, with higher wages in jobs with higher levels of the disamenity. In a dynamic or life cycle context, it is entirely possible for a worker to choose a career path that leads to a job change where the observed wage is lower but the (perhaps unobserved) working conditions are better than in their previous job. Examples might include:
Bond traders or stock brokers who work in high paying but also high stress and long hours jobs; sales jobs that require extensive travel; dangerous or risky jobs, and so on.
In this paper workers change employers without the arrival of new information. A model is constucted that allows workers to choose their career path over various jobs, where a job is defined by a wage and amenity combination, in a setting of complete information. Some workers will initially choose low paying jobs and will migrate to higher paying ones. Other workers will follow 1 Although in principle it is difficult to know whether a separation is voluntary or involuntary, the question in the PSID asks workers to choose from several reasons as to why they left their last job, one of which being that they chose to leave. 2 The model makes no distinction between employer changes or job changers, though in the PSID the question concerns employer changes. However, in this paper, job and employer changes are used interchangeably.
3 Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed (1998) have amenities in a search model but focus on how hedonic wage models can be biased if search is introduced.
precisely the opposite strategy. The key variable that determines the choice of jobs over the lifetime is the worker's rate of time preference. Workers who have a relatively high rate of time preference will move to higher paying jobs over their lifetimes, while those who have a relatively low rate of time preference will move to lower paying jobs.
The movement of workers from high to lower paying jobs has proved somewhat troublesome for standard search models of the labor market. For example, while job changes in search models can be achieved through the arrival of new information or exogenous job destruction, to get individuals to move to lower paying jobs workers must go through a spell of unemployment and revise down their reservation wage, leading to acceptance of a lower paying job. However, the data show that most workers who change employers do so with no intervening unemployment spell (Matilla (1974) ; Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen (1988) ).
Another reason workers may move to a job with a lower level of wages is that the rate of growth of wages is higher with the new employer. Examination of the PSID shows little difference between wage growth before and after the employer change. Section 2 describes the data for workers who change employers in the PSID. Section 3 presents the model. Section 3.4 provides some intuition and extensions. Section 4 concludes. After responding that an employer change took place, some follow-up questions were asked. In particular the worker was asked: How much their wage was when the job ended with their previous employer, how much they earned when they started with their new employer. In addition, the date of the ending of the last job and beginning of the current job was also asked. Reported wages were converted to real wages using the monthly CPI since the dates of job endings and beginnings are given as a month within the year.
Employer Changers in the PSID
For the nine years of data (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) containing the above question, there are 42,765 observations where the respondent had positive income, was either head of the household or spouse of the head, and between the ages 18 and 70. The numbers in Table 1 and Table 2 are averages 4 The question and responses are slightly different for some years.
using all employer changes throughout all of the years. That is, each job change is considered one observation and no account is taken of the fact that some individuals in the data change employers several times while others may change only once.
From that population there were 3,599 people who changed employers for any reason. Table 1 shows summary statistics for all employer changers in the PSID from 1984-1992. However, as mentioned above, this paper is concerned with those workers who answered with response #4. Another reason to change jobs would be to move to a job that has the potential for higher wage growth than the current job. Although it is possible to track wage growth before and after the switch, the PSID only asked these job change questions between 1984 and 1992, so that there are not many years before or after the job change. In any event, it is possible to look at those who changed jobs exactly in the middle year of the data, 1988, and examine their wage growth four years before and four years after the job change. The results show very little difference between wage growth before and after the employer change. However, with so few years of data before and after the employer change, this result should be viewed with caution.
The Model
The model allows for job choice over the life cycle. Workers are born at date 0 and live for one period of continuous time. Job choice, is limited to a discrete number of wage/working condition packages. Within a job, working conditions or "job amenity" is fixed. A worker can only alter the job amenity by changing jobs. 
This assumption is made for convenience. As long as the difference, 
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and
5 If the difference in momentary utility is substantial, workers would never choose the low utility job. Equating the momentary utilities greatly simplifies the mathematics.
The objective function (3) is the worker's lifetime utility. Equation (4) describes how the worker's wealth changes over time. The equations contained in (5) simply say that the worker begins life with no wealth and (optimally) ends his life with no wealth.
The (current value) Hamiltonian, , associated with the maximization problem (3), (4), (5) can be represented as
The solution is given by,
Differentiating (6) with respect to and dividing the outcome by
Equating the right hand sides of (8) and (9) 
The shape of the consumption profile is given by the sign of S ¥ 
and can be rearranged to read
The right hand side of (12) is simply a linear approximation of
is a strictly concave function, the right hand side of (12) must be strictly greater than the left hand side, a contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that
, which, by (11), implies that the worker will not stay at job 1 for his entire lifetime.
Similarly, if we suppose that the worker spends his entire lifetime in job 2, then at some date This inequality can be expressed as
For exactly the same kind of reasoning as above-i.e., the right hand side of (13) (11), contradicts the assertion that the worker will spend his entire lifetime in job 2.
We now describe the worker's sequence of job choices over his lifetime for various values of ¥ .
3.1
, it is not possible for the worker to ever move from job 2 to job 1. If the worker did follow such a sequence, then consumption would necessarily have to fall after the job change, see (11). But when § , the worker's optimal consumption stream, implicitly given by (10), is strictly increasing over his lifetime. Hence, the only possible equilibrium job choice strategy for the worker is to spend the first part of life at job 1 and the second part in job 2. Here, workers are moving from a higher wage job to a lower wage job. This sequence of job choices is consistent with a strictly increasing lifetime consumption profile, i.e., consistent with (11). Note that the worker will change jobs only once; if the worker changed jobs more than once then the level of consumption associated with the second job change, given by (11), would be inconsistent with a strictly increasing lifetime consumption profile.
3.2
, (10) implies that the worker's lifetime consumption profile is strictly decreasing over his lifetime. Hence, it is not possible for the worker to change from job 1 to job 2 since, for this sequencing of job choices, (11) would not be consistent with a strictly decreasing consumption profile. The equilibrium job choice strategy for the worker is to spend the first part of life at job 2 and the second part of his life in job 1; these workers move from lower to higher paying jobs.
This sequence of job choice is consistent with a strictly decreasing lifetime consumption profile, i.e., consistent with (11). The worker will change jobs only once.
3.3
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When the discount rate equals the interest rate, (10) In summary, the sign of ¥ determines whether the worker moves from a high paying job to a low paying one or from the low paying job to a higher paying one. When § , the worker changes jobs once and moves from the high to low paying job. When © , the worker also changes jobs once but moves from the low to high paying job. When ' the worker will change jobs at least once and he is indifferent between job 1 and job 2 as his first job.
Discussion
Initial Job Choice
The intuition behind the choice of an initial job is easiest to see by fixing the amount of time spent in the first job. Job 1, the higher wage job, provides higher lifetime income than job 2; and, the higher the interest rate,
, the greater will be the difference in lifetime incomes. So, as the interest rate increases job 1 looks more and more attractive as a starting job. Conversely, job 2, as an intitial job choice, provides a higher lifetime amenity stream so that as the discount rate, , rises, job 2 looks more attractive as a starting job.
When the "interest rate" effect associated with taking job 1 first dominates the "discount rate" effect of taking job 1 first. So, lifetime utility is higher when job 1 is chosen first. When © the "discount rate" effect dominates the "interest rate" effect, leading to higher lifetime utility by choosing job 2 first. When '
, the "interest rate effect" associated with taking job 1 first exactly offsets the "discount rate effect" associated with taking job 2 first, implying that the worker is indifferent between choosing job 1 and job 2 at date ' .
Job Change
In order to gain some intuition as to why individuals change jobs, assume that a worker lives for only an instant of time. As a first approximation, this allows us to ignore discounting. 6 Imagine that in this instant unit of time the worker spends a fraction in job 1 and ! £ ¥ % in job 2. Over this instant of time financial markets permit the worker to smooth his consumption of the market good, , i.e., the worker can consume approximately
. But, of course, the worker is unable to smooth the consumption of the amenity since the amenity is job specific. Hence, if the worker smooths his consumption of the market good, his utility over the instant of time is
. If the worker spends the entire instant of time in either job 1 or job 2, i.e., the worker does not change jobs, then his utility is equal to 6 Discounting is important in terms of explaining which job the worker will initially take but is not that important in terms of explaining why workers change jobs. For example, when . The worker will prefer changing jobs, compared to staying in the same job, if
where
, inequality (16) holds.
Hence, workers want to change jobs because they effectively get to consume "the average" of
and the only way that they can consume an average of the bundles is by changing jobs. 
Extensions
Worker Heterogeneity
In the data, some individuals move from lower to higher paying jobs and other individuals move from higher to lower paying jobs. The model can be made consistent with both of these observed facts if workers are heterogeneous. For example, one simple form of heterogeneity is that different workers have different discount rates. Let 3 be the discount rate for worker . One can imagine that there is a population of workers and a distribution of discount rates over this population. All workers that have discount rates greater than the interest rate, i.e., § , will spend the first part of the life at the low paying job and the second part at the high paying job; all workers characterized by © will spend the first part of the life at the high paying job and the second part at the low paying job. Hence, heterogeneity along the worker discount rate dimension can generate flows of workers moving from low to high paying jobs and at the same time flows of 7 Our specification of preferences are not the only ones that imply that the worker will want to change jobs. Preferences that are additively separable or CES will also imply that workers will want to change jobs. However, if the consumption good and the job amenity are perfect substitutes, i.e., workers moving from high to low paying jobs.
It might be interesting to know which workers starting at, say job 1 (workers with relativey low discount rates), will be the first to change jobs; the higher discount rate workers or the lower?
It turns out that it is not possible to get an analytical solution to this answer, however, numerical 
Many Jobs
Except for the knife-edge case where '
, workers will change jobs exactly once in their lifetimes. In reality, however, some workers may "never" change jobs or other workers may change jobs more than once over their lifetimes.
The model can be generalized along two dimensions. Suppose first that the instantaneous utilities associated with each job need not be equal. 9 Second, suppose that instead of facing two possible job choices each worker is randomly given § § jobs to choose from over his lifetime.
Without loss of generality, let job £ be the "best" job and job be the "worst" job in the following sense,
If it turns out that the instantaneous utility of job 1 is substantially higher than job 2, then the worker chooses job 1 at date '
and will never change jobs. The case considered in the body of the paper can be interpreted by having the instantaneous utilities of job 1 and job 2 not being significantly different from one another, but the instantaneous utility of job 2 substantially larger than job 3. In this situation, the worker will change jobs once: which job the worker chooses first will depend upon the sign of ¥ ut are "close" in value to one another. Clearly, if the instantaneous utility associated with one job is significantly higher than another then the worker will choose the "high" utility job and will not change jobs. 
